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Telecommunications companies traditionally offer several 
tariffs from which their customers can choose the tariff 
that best suits their preferences. Yet, customers sometimes 
make choices that are not optimal for them because they 
do not minimize their bill for a certain usage amount. 
We show in this paper that companies should be very 
concerned about choices in which customers pick tariffs 
that are too small for them because they lead to a signifi-
cant increase in customers churn. In contrast, this is not 
the case if customers choose tariffs that are too big for 
them. The reason is that in particular flat-rates provide 
customers with the additional benefit that they guarantee 
a constant bill amount that consumption can be enjoyed 
more freely because all costs are already accounted for.
Telecommunications companies traditionally offer tar-
iffs that charge a fixed monthly fee and a price for each 
quantity unit that is consumed. Such strategies have be-
come increasingly prevalent in many industries; pay TV 
companies, for example, offer different packages for 
different selections of channels, but charge an additional 
fee for special broadcasts such as live football games. 
The German national railway company, Deutsche Bahn, 
offers a fixed-price BahnCard that entitles the passenger 
to travel at a discount price for a year, and health clubs 
and recreation centers use similar pricing structures. 
Frequently, such companies offer more than one tariff to 
achieve better market segmentation. Deutsche Bahn, for 
example, offers BahnCard 25, BahnCard 50, and Bahn-
Card 100 at yearly prices of € 55, € 220 and € 3,500 for 
second-class travel. The first two tariffs allow 25 and 50 
percent discounts on standard fares, while BahnCard 
100 allows free unlimited travel on the whole network. 
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Similarly, T-Mobile offers Relax 50, 100, 200 and 1000 
tariffs, allowing customers to make 50, 100, 200 and 
1,000 minutes of calls calls a month for € 10, € 20, € 30 
and € 60 respectively. 
offering more tariff choices allows customers to pick 
those that best fit their individual preferences, but may 
also lead them to choose less than optimal tariffs that 
do not minimize their bill for a certain usage amount. For 
example, a customer may pick T-Mobile’s Relax 1000 
tariff, but regularly make less than 200 minutes of calls 
per month. As a consequence, they will end up with a 
monthly bill of € 60 when they could just as well use the 
Relax 200 tariff at half the price.
Such a mistake is known as flat-rate bias, because 
the customer picks a tariff that offers too many free 
minutes and pays too high a fixed fee. Put differently, 
the tariff is too “big” for him. In many instances, the 
“biggest” tariff a customer can choose would be the flat 
rate; hence the term “flat-rate bias”.
Alternatively, another customer may pick T-Mobile’s 
Relax 50 tariff, but frequently use 100 minutes per 
month. She would end up paying € 25 per month (€ 10 
plus roughly € 0.30 for each of the additional 50 min-
utes), but could have saved € 5 per month by choosing 
the Relax 100 tariff at € 20 per month. Such a mistake is 
dubbed a “pay-per-use bias”, because the customer has 
chosen a tariff that is too “small. The “smallest” tariff a 
customer can choose is often a pure pay-per-use one 
with no fixed fee. 
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The crucial question for companies is whether these mis-
takes are beneficial. They allow them to charge higher 
bills and boost their short-term profitability, but cus-
tomers may be upset when they recognize that they 
have paid more than if they had made a better tariff 
choice. In the best case, an upset customer will simply 
switch to the appropriate tariff. In the worst case, 
however, customers are so frustrated that they take 
their business elsewhere, in which case the boost in the 
company’s short-term profitability substantially harms 
its long-term returns. We therefore wanted to explore 
the effects of such biases on profitability to better 
understand how managers should manage their cus-
tomers’ tariff choices. 
Customers often do not choose wisely
Train / McFadden / Ben-Akiva (1987) observe that US 
households have a general preference for flat rates com-
pared to standard measured service, and prefer flat 
rates for a more extended area to flat rates for a smaller 
area. Hobson / Spady (1988) report “a fair number of 
apparent ‘mistakes’” when analyzing single-person 
household tariff choice, which for the most part involved 
choosing flat-rate service when the monthly billing rate 
under local measured service would have been lower.
Similar results are reported from an AT&T experiment 
where customers with zero consumption chose a block-
of-time tariff instead of a standard usage-based rate 
(Mitchell / Vogelsang 1991). Also, 45 percent of the 
customers that pay a fixed monthly rate for a percent-
age discount on evening and weekend calls, use fewer 
than the break-even volume required to have a lower bill 
than under standard measured service. Kridel / leh-
man / Weisman (1993) find that of the 93 percent of 
customers having selected flat rates, nearly 65 percent 
would save money had they purchased local measured 
service, whereas of the 7 percent that selected local 
measured service only 10 percent would benefit from 
switching to the flat rate. 
Based on health club usage data, Malmendier / DellaVi-
gna (2006) observe that customers choose annual 
contracts, even though they would pay less per visit 
and thus forgo an average savings of $700 during their 
membership. This means they pay 70 percent more than 
they would have done on a per-visit basis. 
All these studies indicate that flat-rate bias is much 
more prominent than pay-per-use bias. only Miravete 
(2002) finds that 6–12 percent of customers wrongly 
choose the flat rate but 62–67 percent wrongly choose 
measured service.
What should you do if customers do 
not always choose wisely?
We wanted to know what managers should do when 
customers make the wrong decisions. Should they tell 
them, or just take the extra money? We therefore had to 
understand the extent of these mistakes, their causes 
and, most importantly, their effects on customer switch-
ing, churn, and long-term profitability. 
We collected a unique set of transactional data for a rep-
resentative sample of 10,882 customers of a European 
internet service provider (ISP), covering a sample period 
of up to 5 months, which could be matched to the results 
of a survey of 941 of the ISP’s customers. This allowed 
us to carry out a detailed analysis of tariff choices. There 
was a choice of three DSl tariffs: 
>  Tariff 1 had a fixed fee and a low monthly allowance,
with an additional charge per megabyte of data over
and above the allowance.
>  Tariff 2 had a higher fixed fee and a higher allowance
than tariff 1, but the same charge for usage exceeding 
the allowance.
>  Tariff 3 was subject to a flat rate with unlimited
usage.
» Companies do not need to be con-
cerned about customers with a flat-rate
bias, though they should be worried
about those with a pay-per-use bias,
because the increase in short-term
profitability is completely offset by the
substantial increase in churn rates. «
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Because of the low allowance, tariff 1 closely resembles 
a pay-per use tariff.
Do f lat-rate bias and pay-per-use bias really exist?
First, we analyzed whether the 10,882 customers picked 
tariffs that with hindsight were more expensive than 
others. We calculated how much they actually paid, and 
how much they would have paid for the same usage 
volume on alternative tariffs. We examined their actual 
and potential bill amounts over (i) several billing periods 
and (ii) every single billing period to see if they were (i) 
wrong overall or (ii) always wrong. “Wrong” here means 
that they chose a tariff that turned out to be more 
expensive for them than another one. The results, shown 
in table 1, confi rm that there was a fl at-rate bias and, to 
a lesser extent, a pay-per-use bias. When the results 
were analyzed over a fi ve-month period they showed 
that the fl at-rate bias persisted over time, whereas the 
pay-per-use bias seldom did. 
In this analysis, more than half the customers with a 
fl at-rate bias paid at least 100 percent more than they 
would have done on the least costly tariff. More than 
half of those with a pay-per-use bias paid at least 20 
percent more than the least costly tariff. This confi rms 
that most customers who picked the wrong tariff did not 
tabLE 1 :
Existence of tariff -choice 
biases – Why do customers 
make “wrong” choices?CRITERIoN 1: “oVERAll WRoNG”
3 Months
5 Months
3 Months
5 Months
chosen 
tariff
chosen 
tariff
chosen 
tariff
chosen 
tariff
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 2
tariff 2
tariff 2
tariff 2
flat Rate
flat Rate
flat Rate
flat Rate
n =  10,882
n =  7,559
n =  10,882
n =  7,559
93.7 %
94.5 %
98.7 %
99.6 %
48.1 %
46.4 %
37.6 %
29.3 %
19.8 %
14.3 %
17.6 %
10.5 %
5.3 %
4.7 %
1.2 %
0.4 %
43.4 %
47.8 %
61.1 %
70.4 %
8.4 %
12.0 %
7.8 %
10.5 %
1.0 %
0.8 %
0.1 %
0.0 %
8.5 %
5.8 %
1.3 %
0.3 %
71.8 %
73.7 %
74.8 %
79.0 %
tariff 2
tariff 2
tariff 2
tariff 2
flat Rate
flat Rate
flat Rate
flat Rate
best tariff
best tariff
best tariff
best tariff
CRITERIoN 2: “AlWAYS WRoNG”
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Table 2: 
INCREASE IN TARIFF SWITCHING AND CHURN PRoBABIlITIES
cRItERIon 1: “oVERaLL WRonG”
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
tariff 1
chosen 
tariff
chosen 
tariff
ta
ri
ff
 s
w
it
ch
in
g
ch
ur
n
tariff 2
tariff 2
flat Rate
flat Rate
***  difference is significant at 0.01
**  difference is significant at 0.05
* difference is significant at 0.1
– not significant at 0.1
1)  tariff switching rates or flat-rate customers for whom flat rate is least costly tariff 
are zero, therefore actual tariff-switching raates are listed
+150 %
-25 %
0 %
+63 %
+220 %
+340 %
1 %1
+25 %
+240 %
+1040 %
***
***
+250 %
+538 %
–
–
–
***
–
–
tariff 2
tariff 2
flat Rate
flat Rate
fRb
fRb
ppub
ppub
signifi cance
signifi cance
cRItERIon 2: “aLWaYs WRonG”
tariff 1
tariff 1
n =  10,882
+67 %
-50 %
0 %
+67 %
+233 %
+650 %
1.1 %1
-100 %
+183 %
+833 %
***
***
-100 %
+492 %
–
**
–
***
*
–
tariff 2
tariff 2
flat Rate
flat Rate
fRb
fRb
ppub
ppub
signifi cance
signifi cance
best tariff
best tariff
best tariff
best tariff
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just deviate slightly from the least costly tariff. We 
were able to confirm this result in additional laboratory 
studies (Refer to table 1).
our additional analysis of the survey results showed 
that these wrong choices have three distinct causes:
>  The “insurance effect”, where customers choose a
flat-rate tariff because they want to avoid any varia-
tion in their monthly bills. This would be the case on a 
pay-per-use tariff if their usage varied over time.
Hence, the flat-rate option represents an insurance
against periods when customers might use the ser-
vice more than they usually do.
>  The “taxi-meter effect”, which indicates that custom-
ers enjoy their usage more when paying a flat rate
than with a pay-per-use tariff. The theory of mental
accounting assumes that the cost of purchasing an
item leads to an immediate pain of paying which can
undermine the pleasure derived from its consumption 
(Prelec / loewenstein 1998). Paying per use lessens
the pleasure of consumption, as the cost, and thus
the pain of paying, are attributed to the consumption 
at the time of usage. Basically, this theory says that a 
taxi ride is more enjoyable if the ride is prepaid be-
cause the ticking of the taxi meter no longer reduces
the pleasure of the journey.
>  The “overestimation effect”, in which customers
overestimate their need for the service and conse-
quently pick a flat-rate rather than a pay-per use
tariff.
All three reasons are important in explaining why 
customers have flat-rate biases. Interestingly, only the 
overestimation effect is driven by a cognitive error 
on the customer’s part, whereas the insurance and 
taxi-meter effects indicate that customers derive addi-
tional utility from a flat-rate tariff. Additional laboratory 
studies confirmed our results. 
The less frequent pay-per-use bias was driven by 
customers underestimating their own usage – in other 
words, it was a cognitive error.
What are the consequences of those “wrong” choices?
So what does this mean in terms of long-term profitabil-
ity? If customers simply ignore their wrong choices and 
the fact that they are throwing money away, companies 
could easily use this to increase their revenue and profit. 
on the flip side, customers may realize they are paying 
too much, become dissatisfied, and simply walk away. 
We therefore calculated tariff-switching and churn 
probabilities for the different tariffs. 
Table 2 shows the differences in these two probabilities 
between customers with and without tariff-choice bias-
es. For example, the tariff-switching probability of cus-
tomers on tariff 1 with a pay-per-use bias who consis-
tently made wrong tariff choices (labeled “criterion 1”) 
was 220 percent higher than that of customers for 
whom tariff 1 was the least costly. For customers that 
would pay the least on the flat rate, the tariff-switching 
probability was 240 percent higher. The corresponding 
differences in tariff switching were substantially smaller 
for customers on the other tariffs. Thus, both biases led 
to a higher tariff-switching probability, though this was 
more likely for customers with a pay-per-use bias than 
for those with a flat-rate bias. 
The churn figures point to a different conclusion: cus-
tomers with flat-rate bias did not have a significantly 
higher probability of taking their business elsewhere. In 
contrast, the monthly churn rates for customers with 
pay-per-use bias were 340 to 1,040 percent higher than 
those of customers that had chosen the least costly 
tariff. The pay-per-use bias, but not the flat-rate bias, 
increases customer churn. When deciding whether to 
switch or go elsewhere, customers with a flat-rate bias 
tend to switch to another tariff with the same provider, 
whereas customers with a pay-per-use bias tend to 
leave (Refer to table 2). 
» If customers simply ignore their
wrong choices and the fact that they
are throwing money away, companies
could easily use this to increase their
revenue and profit. «
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Next, we analyzed the long-term impact on profits 
by calculating customer lifetime values in a customer 
migration model. We assumed that those with tariff-
choice biases could choose between keeping the tariff, 
switching to the least costly tariff, or going elsewhere, 
and we used the observed switching and churn rates as 
the probabilities of moving from one state to another. 
We discounted future profits by 10 percent and com-
pared the lifetime value of customers with tariff-choice 
biases to their lifetime value if they had chosen the least 
costly tariff from the beginning.
The results show that, in the short term, profitability is 
higher for customers with pay-per-use bias than for 
those with flat-rate bias. However, in the long term the 
lifetime value of customers with flat-rate bias is sub-
stantially higher than that of customers with a pay- 
per-use bias. This is a result of the higher switching 
rates, and in particular the higher churn rates, of 
customers with pay-per-use bias.
What are the implications of our results? 
our results indicate that customers with a flat-rate bias 
are not unhappy about paying more than they would 
have done under the least costly tariff. This remarkable 
outcome is driven by the particular characteristic of 
flat-rate tariffs: they guarantee that the bill amount is 
constant and customers can more freely enjoy their 
consumption because all costs are already accounted 
for. While some customers with a flat-rate bias also 
suffer from an overestimation effect, this cognitive error 
is not so large as substantially to increase churn rates.
Consequently, companies do not need to be concerned 
about customers with a flat-rate bias, though they 
should be worried about those with a pay-per-use bias, 
because the increase in short-term profitability is com-
pletely offset by the substantial increase in churn rates. 
We therefore recommend that companies inform these 
customers of their apparent mistake in picking the 
wrong tariff, which is driven by an underestimation of 
usage. This strategy should allow them to lower their 
churn rate. 
All in all, customers seem to have a general preference 
for flat rates, which is in line with the results of other 
studies. Prelec/loewenstein (1998), for example, ana-
lyzed several products and services (such as public 
transportation, food during a cruise, health clubs and 
long-distance phone calls), asking customers whether 
they preferred flat rates, payment per use or neither. 
They found that on average 52 percent preferred the 
flat rate whereas only 28 percent preferred payment per 
use.
We believe that the results of our analyses are valid 
across a range of products and services, such as cell-
phones and fixed-line services, access to wireless local 
area networks, car rental and public transportation. 
For services where customers pre-commit to a certain 
amount of usage, such as exercising twice a week in a 
health club, pre-commitment may also affect tariff 
choice. Pre-commitment is likely to occur when custom-
ers need to make a considerable short-term investment, 
for example in terms of physical effort, and receive long-
term benefits such as better health. So instead of 
looking for the minimum billing rate for a given usage, 
» Customers with a flat-rate bias are not unhappy
about paying more than they would have done under
the least costly tariff. «
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these customers intend to force themselves to follow a 
certain type of behavior. This attitude results in a strong 
flat-rate bias. 
A key message from our analyses is that companies 
should carefully consider any pricing decisions that may 
affect flat-rate customers, such as withdrawing the 
flat-rate option. They should encourage them to take up 
this option by emphasizing the benefits, such as the 
pleasure and independence that a flat rate brings (the 
taxi-meter effect), or the reliability of the billing rate 
(the insurance effect). In addition, companies also have 
an incentive to increase customers’ perceptions of usage 
intensity (the overestimation effect) by highlighting 
the different ways in which they could use the product 
or service.
Flat-rate tariffs may present a risk if the company serves 
a significant segment of extremely heavy users. To avoid 
dramatic increases in costs, many businesses have intro-
duced a fair use policy that caps usage at a level which 
exceeds that of the average user but makes the offering 
substantially less attractive for heavy users.
Importantly, a company will not only reduce its profits 
when customers suffer from pay-per-use bias, but will 
also be in danger of negatively affecting its reputation. 
Customers who realize they have chosen the wrong 
tariff may blame the company rather than themselves 
for paying too much. In addition, the high churn rates of 
pay-per-use customers may adversely affect the com-
pany’s reputation. Therefore, businesses should steer 
new customers towards the flat-rate option or tariffs 
with high usage allowances and suggest that existing 
customers with a pay-per-use bias switch to a tariff with 
a higher fixed fee and usage allowance.   •
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